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 On May 15, 1972, the United States returned Okinawa and the other islands in the Ryukyu chain to Japan, culminating years of negotiations that some have 
hailed as “an example of diplomacy at its very best�”1 As a result, Japan regained 
territories it had lost at the end of World War II, while the United States both 
retained access to bases on Okinawa and reaffirmed strategic ties with Japan� 
One detail, however, complicates this win-win assessment� At the same time, 
Japan also regained administrative control over the Senkaku, or Diaoyu, Islands, 
a group of uninhabited—and uninhabitable—rocky outcroppings in the East 
China Sea�2 By 1972, both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic 
of China (ROC) on Taiwan also had claimed these islands�3 Despite passing con-
trol of the Senkakus to Japan, the United States expressed no position on any of 
the competing claims to the islands, including Japan’s� This choice—not to weigh 
in on the Senkakus’ sovereignty—perpetuated 
the underlying dispute and fostered tensions that 
recently have found new expression�
To this day, Japan administers the Senkakus, 
China and Taiwan claim them, and the United 
States ostensibly maintains its neutral position 
with regard to their sovereignty�4 U�S� leaders 
across recent administrations have stated publicly, 
however, that treaty obligations to defend Japan 
include the Senkakus�5 So, although the United 
States takes no explicit position on the Senkakus’ 
sovereignty, it has committed to defending them� 
Washington’s seemingly contradictory stance on 
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the Senkakus contributes to the risk of misunderstanding and conflict over these 
islands, which some analysts describe as the “most likely flash point” in Sino-
Japanese relations�6
Beijing’s military, political, and economic efforts to uphold its claim and 
challenge Tokyo’s are of particular concern� Militarily, China operates naval and 
paramilitary forces near the Senkakus to challenge and erode Japan’s control over 
the islands�7 Politically, in November 2013 China attempted to regulate air traffic 
in the East China Sea by declaring an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) that 
encompassed the Senkakus�8 Economically, China reprimands companies that do 
not acknowledge Beijing’s claim; in one recent example, the Chinese government 
ordered Muji, a Japanese housewares company, to “seal and scrap” catalogs that 
featured “faulty maps” of China that did not include the Senkakus�9 China’s ap-
parent desire to challenge the status quo in the East China Sea may increase the 
risk of a conflict that likely would involve the United States�
This risk could increase if Beijing and Tokyo doubt Washington’s commitment 
to defend the islands on Japan’s behalf� Political scientist Thomas C� Schelling 
once described the Taiwanese island of Quemoy, just off the coast of China, as 
“a ragged edge about which [U�S�] intentions were ambiguous�” Schelling argued 
that because the United States appeared unwilling to defend Quemoy on behalf of 
its ally Taiwan, China may have felt emboldened to attack it�10 During the 1950s, 
Beijing and Taipei fought over the island in two wars, both of which involved 
the United States� Despite public assurances of U�S� resolve, the Senkakus could 
become a similar, modern “ragged edge” if Beijing doubts the credibility of Wash-
ington’s commitment to these isolated islands� This risk may increase further if, 
as Eric Heginbotham and Richard J� Samuels suggest, “some Japanese question 
the extent of the U�S� commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands�”11
Why did the United States sidestep questions raised during the Okinawa re-
version negotiations about the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands? Washington’s 
preference for successfully reverting Okinawa, including the Senkakus, while 
walking a fine line regarding the sovereignty question—neither placating nor ag-
gravating other claimants—most likely shaped U�S� policy choices� To understand 
the factors that influenced the transactional U�S� approach to returning admin-
istrative control over the Senkakus to Japan, this article first will review existing 
theories about U�S� decision-making� These explanations discount the context 
of the decision and the complex interactions within the U�S� government and 
among Washington and the three claimants� Second, the article will review the 
historical roots of each claim to the Senkakus and describe how the United States 
gained control of the islands at the end of World War II� Third, the article will 
analyze post–World War II U�S� decision-making toward Okinawa, culminating 
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in the decision to return it to Japan, and the choices subsequently made—or 
avoided—about the Senkakus� On the basis of this analysis, the article finds that 
U�S� decision-making on the Senkakus’ sovereignty may have emerged from 
a complex policy-making process focused on achieving the proximate policy 
objectives of returning Okinawa and reaffirming the U�S�-Japan alliance, while 
accepting future strategic risk� Fourth, the article will conclude with a review of 
the contemporary policy implications of this understanding of the origins of U�S� 
policy toward the Senkakus�
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: STRATEGIC GAMBIT OR  
BUREAUCRATS RUN AMOK?
Analysts have proposed several different explanations for why the United States 
returned the Senkaku Islands to Japan in the way it did� Some argue that the 
United States saw the ambiguous status of the islands as a means to a strategic end 
in East Asia, while others argue that bureaucratic behavior or existing precedent 
constrained U�S� options� These explanations take a too-narrow perspective on 
this complicated issue and provide an incomplete analysis, which could have 
misleading policy implications�
Several scholars argue that the United States made decisions about the Sen-
kakus with a strategic eye toward shaping the future western Pacific security en-
vironment� Kimie Hara, a historian at the University of Waterloo, Canada, argues 
that Washington deliberately left this territorial dispute unresolved to sustain 
Sino-Japanese tensions and act as a mechanism to ensure that Tokyo would con-
tinue to permit U�S� access to military bases in Japan�12 Jean-Marc F� Blanchard, a 
political scientist at East China Normal University, makes a nearly opposite argu-
ment� Writing before many U�S� archival sources were available, he speculates that 
the United States “betrayed” Japan by not endorsing its sovereignty claim, in an 
effort to “curry favor with the Chinese whom [the United States] was seeking as 
allies against the Soviet Union�”13 Hara and Blanchard make realpolitik cases and 
suggest that giving Japan administrative control, rather than full sovereignty, over 
the Senkakus was a ploy either to maintain Sino-Japanese tensions or to promote 
Sino-U�S� rapprochement�
China similarly ascribes strategic motives to U�S� policy� A December 1971 
statement by the Chinese foreign ministry argues that “U�S� and Japanese reac-
tionaries � � � barter[ed] China’s Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands and use[d] Chinese 
territory to sow dissension between the Chinese and Japanese people�”14 A 2012 
white paper uses less-inflammatory language to assert that the U�S� government 
both administered the Senkakus and transferred them to Japan in an “illegal 
and invalid” fashion, constituting “acts of grave violation of China’s territorial 
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sovereignty�” Chief among these acts were “arbitrarily” including the Senkakus 
in U�S� postwar jurisdiction, and conducting “backroom deals” with Japan to 
include the Senkakus in the reversion of Okinawa�15
Some U�S� government leaders and analysts who participated in the decision-
making pertaining to the Senkakus contemporaneously emphasized the impact 
of bureaucratic actors and precedent� In June 1971, Henry A� Kissinger, the as-
sistant to the president for national security affairs (i�e�, national security advisor) 
for President Richard M� Nixon, expressed to Nixon his frustration with the U�S� 
State Department and how its actions during the Okinawa reversion negotiations 
constrained the president’s options� He said, “Mr� President, this is one of those 
examples where the bureaucracy, ’til they got into trouble, no one even told us 
there was an issue�” He then lamented that by the time he looked into the issue “it 
was already down the drain,” implying that negotiations were too far along—it 
was an issue to which U�S� and Japanese diplomats already had agreed�16
A State Department briefing paper on the Senkakus written in 1972 took a 
fatalistic approach, stating that “we had little choice other than to return these 
islands to Japan along with the rest of the Ryukyus” because of how the United 
States had gained control of them�17 The memo describes how the United States 
took over administration of the Senkakus—and the rest of the Ryukyus—from 
Japan at the end of the war, and suggests that this circumstance limited the United 
States to returning them to Japan as a collective whole� Both Kissinger and the 
anonymous State Department analyst provide compelling descriptions of what 
they experienced or observed, but they neglect to examine fully how and why 
U�S� participants developed this policy�
To provide a more thorough understanding of U�S� decision-making, this 
article will broaden the inquiry’s scope beyond just the Senkakus to consider 
other interests that influenced U�S� government policy makers� This analysis in-
corporates declassified U�S� government correspondence, Nixon and Kissinger’s 
recorded conversations, and (where English-language sources permit) the three 
claimants’ perspectives and their impact on U�S� policy� Other analysts have 
evaluated much of this documentary evidence, but the Nixon tapes provide new 
and valuable insight into decision-making at the highest level�18 There are inher-
ent limits to the conclusions that one can draw from reading primary sources 
and evaluating their impact on decisions; nonetheless, this analytical approach 
usefully tests existing theories and advances a plausible alternative hypothesis�19 
Opening the analytical aperture beyond just the question of sovereignty over the 
Senkakus makes it appear more likely that questions of whether, when, and how 
to return Okinawa to Japan played an outsize and underappreciated role in deci-
sions that U�S� policy makers made or deferred on the Senkakus�
NWC_Summer2019Review.indb   104 5/2/19   11:35 AM
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/8
 WAT T S  1 0 5
In the years leading up to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, the United 
States had a significant foreign policy goal: to strengthen relations with Japan� 
Across several administrations, U�S� leaders evaluated and debated the trade-off 
between holding on to Okinawa for its strategic value and returning it to Japan� 
By the time of Nixon’s presidency, U�S� policy makers considered reversion to be 
an opportunity to reinforce the U�S�-Japan alliance and encourage Tokyo to take 
on more leadership in Asia� Once President Nixon decided to revert Okinawa to 
Japan, the U�S� government, led by the State Department, worked within existing 
processes to resolve many pertinent issues, including the sovereign status of the 
Senkakus� Defining the Senkakus’ status became increasingly complicated, how-
ever, as other U�S� political objectives came into play and interacted with Taiwan’s 
and China’s competing claims� As reversion negotiations drew to a close, several 
conflicting political goals came to a head in key decisions by President Nixon, 
because these negotiations occurred simultaneously with domestically significant 
textile trade discussions with Japan and Taiwan and in parallel with President 
Nixon’s secret diplomacy with China�
Rather than a calculated international gambit, the result of diplomats keeping 
political leaders in the dark, or just an inevitable outcome, U�S� decision-making 
toward the Senkakus may be understood better as an outcome of complex U�S� 
foreign policy processes in which policy makers encountered the thorny ques-
tion of the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but deferred a lasting settlement 
to achieve the immediate and transactional goal of returning Okinawa to Japan�
CLAIMS ON THE SENKAKUS AND U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE  
CONTROL
Japan, China, and Taiwan all claim the Senkaku Islands� The historical context 
is that Japan first claimed islands in the East China Sea in 1879 when it annexed 
the Ryukyus, including Okinawa� Previously the islands had been relatively au-
tonomous, but they paid tribute to both Japan and China� China opposed Japan’s 
annexation� Even then, the United States played a role in addressing competing 
claims in the East China Sea; during an 1879 visit to Asia, former president 
Ulysses S� Grant encouraged the two parties to negotiate about the Ryukyus, but 
the talks quickly broke down�20
Japan asserts that it then (in 1884) determined the Senkakus to be terra nullius, 
meaning they were unclaimed and uninhabited, and therefore international law 
allowed any state to acquire them by exercising effective and continuing control�21 
Japan claimed them in January 1895, in the midst of the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese 
War�22 Proponents of Japan’s claim note that it preceded and is separate from the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the war several months later, in April 1895�23 
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In that treaty China ceded Taiwan to Japan, ended its political dominance in Ko-
rea, and opened up new ports to Japanese trade� The pact has been described as 
the most “galling” of China’s nineteenth-century humiliations�24
China, on the other hand, asserts that the islands were not terra nullius because 
China discovered them in 1403 and that “Chinese fishermen have exploited the 
islands and their adjacent waters for generations�” Furthermore, Beijing argues 
that, despite the several months’ difference between Tokyo’s claim to the Senkakus 
and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the claim still should be considered part of Japan’s 
pattern of territorial aggrandizement and aggressive behavior toward China in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries�25 China also asserts that the 
United States should not have held the Senkaku Islands at the end of the war, 
that instead China should have recovered them “in accordance with the Cairo 
Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration” as one of the “territories invaded and 
occupied by Japan�”26 Taiwan highlights similar historical evidence in its claim�27
The Cairo Declaration, a joint communiqué that followed a U�S�-U�K�-ROC 
summit in November 1943, declared in part: “Japan shall be stripped of all the 
islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of 
the First World War in 1914, and that all territories stolen from the Chinese � � � 
shall be restored to the Republic of China� Japan will also be expelled from all 
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed�”28 The United States, 
Great Britain, and China reaffirmed this approach in the July 1945 Potsdam 
Declaration, which stated in part that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall 
be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine�”29 Modern 
Chinese sources (both in Beijing and in Taipei) consider the Senkakus to be part 
of Taiwan Province (of the PRC and the ROC, respectively) and argue that the 
Senkakus were among the territories “taken by violence and greed” during the 
period of the Sino-Japanese War and should have been returned to China at the 
end of World War II�30
The United States occupied Japan at the end of World War II� It desired to 
retain strategically located Okinawa even after ending the occupation of Japan’s 
home islands�31 U�S� and Japanese commanders on Okinawa signed a surren-
der document on September 7, 1945, that “formally [rendered] unconditional 
surrender of the islands in the Ryukyus” and geographically defined them� As 
shown on the map, this area included the Senkakus�32 The United States changed 
its definition of the Ryukyus twice over the next eight years as it returned some 
islands to Japan, but each time the Senkakus remained within the boundaries of 
U�S� administration�
The United States planned to maintain control over the Ryukyus indefinitely� 
A 1948 U�S� National Security Council (NSC) report about U�S� goals for a peace 
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treaty with Japan noted that “the United States intends to retain on a long-term 
basis the facilities at Okinawa and such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° N,” which is 
roughly the northern end of the Ryukyu Islands� The report also indicated that 
Washington would seek international support for “United States long-term 
strategic control” of those islands�33 The United States pursued this goal in part 
through the peace settlement�
The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty ended the war in the Pacific, but also 
granted control of the Ryukyus to the United States� Article III named the United 
States as the “sole administering authority” over “Nansei Shoto south of 29 de-
grees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands)�”34 The 
term Nansei Shoto refers to southwestern (nansei) islands and included all islands 
not explicitly returned to the Republic of China between 29 degrees north lati-
tude and Formosa�35 Before the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect in April 
1952, the U�S� Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) issued Ordinance 
Number 68 on February 29, 1952, to outline the structure of the government of 
the Ryukyu Islands� The ordinance began by defining “the area of political and 
geographical jurisdiction of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands�”36 This area 
roughly matched the 1945 definition of the Ryukyus, but the northern boundary 
shifted to the south by one degree of latitude, as shown on the map�
Senkaku Islands
Miyako Islands
Yaeyama Islands
Amami Islands
Okinawa
Ta
iw
an
Japan
China
Ryukyu Islands: Area Administered by the United States
Japanese Surrender: Sep. 7, 1945
USCAR Ordinance 68: Feb. 29, 1952
USCAR Proclamation 27: Dec. 25, 1953
0 60 120 Miles
0 70 140 Kilometers
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The terminology in the San Francisco treaty was ambiguous about both Ja-
pan’s sovereign rights over the Ryukyu Islands and the inclusion of the Senkakus� 
The treaty neither prohibited Japan from repossessing the Ryukyus in the future 
nor closed off alternative territorial settlements with other countries� At the San 
Francisco conference and again during Senate ratification of the treaty, however, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that Japan would hold “residual sover-
eignty” of these territories, which suggested that U�S� administrative control was 
granted by Japan and only would be returned to Japan, not transferred to another 
country�37 The San Francisco treaty did not name the Senkakus explicitly as being 
among the islands over which control was ceded to the United States, but they lay 
within the bounds of the treaty’s vague territorial delineation�
USCAR Proclamation 27 of December 25, 1953, again updated the geographic 
definition of the islands under U�S� control�38 USCAR delineated new boundaries 
because the United States returned the Amami Islands to Japan on that day� The 
map shows how this change again diminished the area under U�S� control but did 
not affect the boundaries encompassing the Senkaku Islands� USCAR Proclama-
tion 27 is a particularly significant document because it provided the definition 
of the Ryukyus that would be current during the Okinawa reversion negotia-
tions� The Chinese government argues that in 1953 the United States arbitrarily 
expanded its definition of the Ryukyus to include the Senkakus�39 The historical 
record indicates, however, that the Senkakus had been within the U�S� definition 
of the Ryukyus since 1945�
After this examination of the details of how Japan and then the United States 
gained control of the Senkakus, it is important next to consider the broader con-
text of U�S� policy toward Okinawa and U�S�-Japan relations�
OKINAWA AND EVOLVING U.S. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES  
IN EAST ASIA
To place the reversion of Okinawa and the disposition of the Senkaku Islands 
within the appropriate historical framework, it is useful first to understand how 
U�S� policy makers perceived the relative significance to the United States of pos-
sessing Okinawa versus strengthening the alliance relationship with Japan, and 
how this perception changed over time�
The relationship between the conflicting U�S� policy objectives of controlling 
Okinawa and deepening ties with Japan evolved over three distinct periods� First, 
during Dwight D� Eisenhower’s and John F� Kennedy’s presidencies, U�S� leader-
ship prioritized control of bases on Okinawa over the relationship with Japan� 
Second, during Lyndon B� Johnson’s administration, U�S� policy makers began 
to accept the idea of eventually returning Okinawa to Japan but would not com-
mit to a time frame� Third, Richard M� Nixon valued more highly the broader 
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U�S�-Japan strategic alliance and sought to return Okinawa while still maintain-
ing access to its bases� This shift in U�S� policy priorities can be observed in the 
evolving positions taken by these presidents and their key advisers, along with 
U�S� perceptions of Japanese domestic political demands for reversion and com-
mitment to the alliance�
Eisenhower and Kennedy: Reluctant to Revert
Presidents Dwight D� Eisenhower and John F� Kennedy both believed that it was 
strategically and militarily important to retain control of Okinawa indefinitely� As 
early as 1953, however, it was evident to senior U�S� policy makers that the U�S� 
occupation of Okinawa and the other Ryukyus could impede the improvement 
of relations with Japan� During a December 23, 1953, NSC meeting, Secretary 
of State Dulles warned Eisenhower that the United States should “expect a very 
unpleasant reaction” from Japan to the U�S� intention to control the Ryukyus 
indefinitely� Furthermore, he warned that “the effect of such bad relations might 
go far to offset the military advantages we would gain from the military rights 
we retained in Okinawa�” Vice President Nixon, who had just returned from 
a trip to Asia, agreed with Secretary Dulles, believing that the continued U�S� 
hold on Okinawa could expose Washington to accusations of colonialism� These 
arguments did not sway President Eisenhower, however; he dismissed them by 
pointing out that “the Russians are in the Kuriles and lots of other places where 
they don’t belong�”40 A 1954 NSC report on U�S�-Japan relations acknowledged 
that Japan desired the return of the Ryukyus, but “because of the critical strategic 
importance of these islands, the United States must continue to impress upon 
the Japanese its intention to retain control over them pending the establishment 
of enduring conditions of peace and stability in the Far East,” implying an open-
ended time frame�41
President Kennedy continued Eisenhower’s policy toward Okinawa� He blunt-
ly told the U�S� Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1963 that he “had no intention of 
giving up the island�”42 Okinawa was critically important to U�S� security policy 
in East Asia� Unlike at other bases in Japan, nuclear weapons were stationed 
there officially� Conventional forces operating from the island were critical com-
ponents in contingency planning for defending South Korea and Taiwan, and 
became important to executing the Vietnam War� Equally significant, because 
of U�S� administrative control, the United States could operate these forces as it 
wished, unfettered by any other nation�43 During a conversation with Japanese 
prime minister Hayato Ikeda on June 21, 1961, President Kennedy described 
the importance of Okinawa to U�S� security, stating that the “only interest of the 
U�S� in the Ryukyus is to support our security position in Southeast Asia and 
Korea” and that without base access “we might have to deploy all the way back 
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to Hawaii�” He then noted that “our interest in the area is not colonial, but flows 
purely from security considerations�” Kennedy concluded that the United States 
and Japan shared an interest in “avoiding pressures for reversion�”44
During the Kennedy administration, Japanese leaders did not apply meaning-
ful pressure on the U�S� government to revert Okinawa� Prime Minister Ikeda 
focused on developing the Japanese economy and strengthening ties with the 
United States, which would reduce the need for and expense of rearmament�45 
He did not seek Okinawa’s return and instead advised President Kennedy to take 
steps that would lessen the emerging domestic political pressure to reincorporate 
Okinawa into Japan, such as by helping to improve the local economy�46 Kennedy 
took this advice to heart and commissioned a Ryukyus Task Force to understand 
better how to reduce local dissatisfaction�47 The task force’s report noted that 
“[w]hile the [Japanese] government continues to speak formally in favor of the 
return to Japanese administration, it recognizes that we in fact have no intention 
of making any such transfer for the indefinite future, and that its position on 
this matter is for the public record only�”48 The U�S� State Department shared this 
impression that the Japanese government spoke about reversion only to satisfy its 
domestic audience�49 It was not until the Johnson administration that Japan more 
forcefully sought Okinawa’s return�
Johnson: Okinawa Bases or U.S.-Japan Alliance?
U�S� interests in Okinawa and the American relationship with Japan began to 
change during the Johnson administration� Lyndon B� Johnson at first continued 
Kennedy’s policies� When Deputy Under Secretary of State U� Alexis Johnson 
briefed the newly appointed U�S� high commissioner of the Ryukyus in June 1964, 
he explained that the United States intended to “stay in the Ryukyus for as long 
as there is a military requirement for our bases there�”50 By that August, however, 
some government officials recognized that “Okinawa remains a simmering and 
potentially dangerous issue in terms of U�S� relations with Japan” and that the 
United States faced a “hard choice between our military bases on Okinawa and 
our strategic alliance with Japan�”51
President Johnson publicly expressed his Okinawa policy in a joint commu-
niqué with Japanese prime minister Eisaku Satō in January 1965� The statement 
describes Japan’s interest in eventual reversion but concludes that such a change 
would happen at an indefinite time in the future when the United States no longer 
needed Okinawan bases� The communiqué notes that Japan sought reversion “as 
soon as feasible,” while the United States “look[ed] forward to the day when the 
security interests of the free world in the Far East [would] permit the realization 
of this desire�”52 However, with bases on Okinawa supporting military operations 
in Vietnam, it was impossible to predict when security interests would permit 
reversion under this formula�
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Over the next several years, Japan’s leaders focused their political and diplo-
matic efforts on the Okinawa issue� In August 1965, Satō visited Okinawa and 
declared that World War II would not be over until the United States returned 
the Ryukyus to Japan�53 By 1967, Japanese officials increasingly expressed their 
desire for Okinawa’s reversion and their frustration with the U�S� pledge to re-
turn the islands only after tensions relaxed in East Asia� During one week in July 
1967, Japanese officials in both Washington and Tokyo approached their U�S� 
counterparts in a seemingly coordinated effort to discuss Okinawa’s status ahead 
of the next Satō-Johnson meeting that November� In Washington, the Japanese 
ambassador warned Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
William P� Bundy that “the present trend of developments appears to be leading 
toward the creation of new problems which might damage fundamental U�S�-
Japan relations�” The ambassador also expressed frustration that the “military im-
portance” of Okinawa “will never decrease,” postponing reversion indefinitely�54 
In Tokyo, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki met clandestinely with U�S� ambassador 
U� Alexis Johnson and discussed “how to reconcile Japanese desire for reversion 
with military requirements�”55 The pressure Japan applied in these meetings may 
have spurred the U�S� government to reexamine reversion�
Several weeks later, State Department officials argued that there would not 
be a better opportunity to resolve “the only major problem between Japan and 
the United States�” In a memo to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, William Bundy 
explained that “we are prepared to negotiate on reversion provided they give us 
advance commitments to assure broad freedom of action for the use of U�S� bases, 
particularly to support the Vietnam War, and to enlarge [Japan’s] political and 
economic role in Asia�” He then pointed out that “our prospects for reaching an 
agreement with Japan on this basis will never be better than at the present time” 
and that “the longer we delay negotiations the greater the danger that an explosive 
situation could develop�” If a deal was not reached, domestic political pressure 
on Japan’s leaders eventually could force the United States out of Okinawa on 
less favorable terms, perhaps as soon as 1970, when “the Security Treaty debate 
could bring irresistible pressures for reversion�”56 The Treaty of Mutual Coopera-
tion and Security between the United States and Japan (known as the Security 
Treaty), which established the U�S�-Japan alliance, was up for renewal in 1970� 
The original treaty, signed in 1954 and amended in 1960, had sparked political 
controversy in Japan, and State Department officials expected the renewal to roil 
Japanese domestic politics if Okinawa remained unresolved�57 Despite dissent 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Robert S� McNamara agreed 
that smoothly renewing the Security Treaty was more important than retaining 
Okinawa�58
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In several memos to the president ahead of a November 1967 meeting between 
President Johnson and Prime Minister Satō, Secretary of State Rusk and the na-
tional security advisor, Walt W� Rostow, outlined U�S� interests regarding Okinawa 
reversion� Secretary Rusk argued that Japan should play a more active and equi-
table role in the U�S�-Japan alliance� He wrote, “[W]e want Japan as a partner— 
not as a rival—in Asia, but as [a] partner sharing the political and economic bur-
dens of regional responsibility�”59 Rostow outlined the U�S� government’s position 
on reversion and its relationship to U�S�-Japan relations, writing, “The fact is that 
the old, immediately pre-war relationship is changing and must change� Our ob-
jective can only now be a gradual and judicious transition into a new relationship 
in which the Japanese take increased responsibility as a partner as we alter the 
essentially occupation status on the islands�”60 Thus U�S� policy began to prioritize 
the alliance with Japan over the unrestricted use of Okinawan bases�
Diplomatic and intelligence reports prior to the November summit also 
emphasized the importance of Okinawa to Japanese domestic politics� The U�S� 
ambassador in Tokyo reported that Satō would seek “a commitment on Okinawa 
which would represent a step forward beyond [the] 1965 communiqué�”61 The 
State Department’s director of intelligence and research described Okinawa re-
version as “the leading political issue in Japan today” and noted that, “wittingly or 
unwittingly, Prime Minister Sato has staked a large amount of his political pres-
tige on his handling of the reversion issue�” The analysis concluded that “popular 
sentiment demands something more concrete than a U�S� promise to return Oki-
nawa when security conditions permit�”62 A Central Intelligence Agency report 
noted that Satō faced increasing domestic political pressures to recover Okinawa 
and that “he reportedly considers it vital that his [November 1967] Washington 
trip result in some positive progress toward meeting Japanese desires�”63
Thus, it was in both U�S� and Japanese interests to make progress toward 
reversion� During their November 1967 summit, President Johnson and Prime 
Minister Satō acted on this shared interest and moved closer to reversion� Their 
joint communiqué provided more-tangible conditions for Okinawa’s return to 
Japan� Satō urged that “within a few years” the two governments should agree on 
a “date satisfactory to them for reversion of these Islands�”64
During Johnson’s presidency, U�S� policy shifted from prioritizing base access 
toward a willingness to discuss reversion, owing to the greater importance of 
maintaining and strengthening the U�S�-Japan alliance� Japan’s increased asser-
tiveness about recovering Okinawa occurred simultaneously with, and may have 
spurred, this policy shift�
Nixon: Ready to Revert
Returning Okinawa to Japan while retaining U�S� military freedom of action was 
one of Richard Nixon’s foreign policy goals� From his service as Eisenhower’s 
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vice president, Nixon was familiar with the debate within the U�S� government 
about Okinawa� As early as 1968, then–presidential candidate Nixon privately 
expressed a willingness to return Okinawa to Japan, provided that Tokyo would 
play more of a leadership role in Asia�65 As president, he publicly agreed with 
Prime Minister Satō in a 1969 joint communiqué to revert Okinawa, leading to 
the June 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement and Okinawa’s return to Japan in 
May 1972� The Senkakus played little apparent role in the negotiations ahead of 
the 1969 communiqué but were among many factors affecting the more detailed 
negotiations leading to the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement�
For Nixon, reverting Okinawa to Japan was not just a goal but a priority� He 
viewed Okinawa as a “constant irritant” in U�S�-Japan relations and believed that 
resolving the issue could encourage Japan to take a larger role in ensuring Asian 
security�66 Upon entering office, Nixon told his NSC that he wanted to return 
control of the Ryukyus to Japan, so long as basing rights could be retained�67 After 
only a few months in office, his administration issued National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM) 13, articulating its Japan policy� The classified document 
described Japan as “our major partner in Asia,” argued that the mutual-defense 
treaty should remain in effect after 1970, and recommended that the United 
States encourage Japan to “seek an increasingly larger � � � role in Asia�”68
NSDM 13 also set three objectives for reverting Okinawa to Japan� First, an 
initial agreement should be reached in 1969, allowing time to negotiate the details 
and complete reversion by 1972� While unstated, this timeline would allow Nixon 
to return Okinawa before his term ended� Second, the United States desired 
“maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect 
to Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam�” Third, although the United States desired to 
keep nuclear weapons on Okinawa, it would agree to withdraw them if it could 
retain “emergency storage and transit rights�”69 Achieving these goals would en-
able the United States to retain most of the military benefits it already enjoyed on 
Okinawa while ending a major irritant in bilateral relations and shoring up the 
U�S� alliance with Japan� Negotiations with the Japanese began in earnest in June 
1969 and continued through the Nixon-Satō summit that November�70
Prime Minister Satō remained a staunch advocate of Okinawa reversion, yet 
proved willing to negotiate� Recovering Okinawa—with no U�S� nuclear weap-
ons remaining—was his political priority� Furthermore, he wanted Okinawa 
to be treated on a “homeland basis,” meaning that the United States would be 
prohibited from deploying nuclear weapons there in the future, just as it was 
with regard to mainland Japan�71 Yet despite this public antinuclear stance, Satō 
was more interested in regaining Okinawa than in restricting nuclear weapons 
fully� Through high-level back-channel negotiations, Satō agreed to a more flex-
ible, secret arrangement: if the United States removed all nuclear weapons from 
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Okinawa before reversion, the United States could return nuclear weapons to the 
island in an emergency� This met Nixon’s policy goal�72
These negotiations culminated in a joint communiqué issued on November 
21, 1969� In it, President Nixon and Prime Minister Satō announced their inten-
tion to transfer control of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands from the United 
States to Japan by 1972� The United States agreed to remove nuclear weapons 
from Okinawa but retained access to “such military facilities and areas in Okina-
wa as required in the mutual security of both countries�” The communiqué noted 
that by settling “the last of the major issues between the two countries arising 
from the Second World War” the agreement “would further strengthen United 
States–Japan relations � � � and would make a major contribution to the peace and 
security of the Far East�”73
By agreeing to revert Okinawa to Japan while achieving all the goals set out in 
NSDM 13, the communiqué was a diplomatic achievement for the Nixon admin-
istration� There is no evidence that the status of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands 
played any role in these initial negotiations�
OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
After this public declaration of a high-level consensus between the United States 
and Japan that Okinawa and other islands under U�S� control should revert to 
Japan, the hard work of negotiating the details began� The status of the Senkaku 
Islands was among those details�
The State Department led the U�S� government effort to negotiate the Oki-
nawa Reversion Agreement� U�S� negotiators operated within the bounds of their 
established procedures to address the Senkakus’ status, and they believed that 
adjudicating this issue was within their remit� Contrary to Kissinger’s depiction 
of them as rogue bureaucrats boxing in the president, they appear to have negoti-
ated within their perceived limits�
Delegated Responsibility and Negotiating Instructions
The U�S� State Department delegated the negotiations to the U�S� embassy in 
Tokyo, and provided explicit instructions to establish goals, constraints, and pro-
cedures� The instructions granted the embassy “overall responsibility for conduct 
of the negotiations,” while laying out five “general objectives”: 
1� “To retain maximum military flexibility for our Okinawa bases”
2� “To arrange an orderly transfer of administrative rights over Okinawa”
3� “To assure maximum economic and financial benefit to [the] U�S�”
4� “To assure best arrangements for the future of U�S� business and other 
private U�S� interests on Okinawa”
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5� “To assure public support of [the] continued U�S� military presence”
A number of additional political, military, and economic aims supplemented the 
general objectives� The instructions also directed negotiators to “refer new or 
unresolved issues not adequately covered by instructions to Washington together 
with your recommendations as appropriate�”74 The Senkaku Islands later fell into 
this category�
The reversion negotiations were inherently complex but were within the 
capacity of the participating U�S� organizations� A State Department negotiator, 
Charles A� Schmitz, later recalling the negotiations, said that “there were thou-
sands of details that needed to be addressed and somehow resolved before rever-
sion could take place, and several hundred of them had to be negotiated and put 
into the treaty itself�”75 For example, a status report in September 1970—nine 
months into the process—listed over thirty significant issues still being worked 
out, including currency conversion, disposition of U�S�-owned assets, civil avia-
tion agreements, defense responsibilities, trade arrangements, radio frequencies, 
telecommunications, and postal procedures�76 Notably, the status of the Senkakus 
did not appear on this list� Many of these issues were technical in nature, but 
some had meaningful policy implications and received attention at higher levels 
of government, including from the president�
The State Department oversaw the U�S� negotiators for this high-visibility 
process� The U�S� embassy in Tokyo provided routine updates on progress to 
Foggy Bottom and, per instructions, referred a number of issues to higher head-
quarters in Washington for resolution�77 For example, an October 1970 summit 
between Nixon and Prime Minister Satō provided an opportunity for the State 
Department to brief the president about the negotiations� Several days before 
the summit, U� Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and 
prior ambassador to Japan, informed the president that “reversion negotiations 
are progressing reasonably well, but potentially serious problems are emerging�” 
These problems included “the future of American business on Okinawa, includ-
ing civil aviation, and the continuation of a VOA [Voice of America] relay broad-
casting from Okinawa�”78 He did not include the status of the Senkaku Islands in 
this list of problems�
Remarks by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger at the October 24, 1970, 
summit suggest that both were comfortable with the progress made in the ongo-
ing negotiations and the latitude given to the negotiators� According to notes 
summarizing the discussions, Nixon told Satō that “he [Nixon] had told our 
people to cooperate in working out little problems in the same way that he and 
the Prime Minister had cooperated in solving the big problem,” meaning the na-
tional commitment to return Okinawa� Kissinger followed up on the president’s 
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comments by noting the specific disagreements on civil aviation and VOA 
broadcasting but “explained to the President that VOA and civil aviation had not 
been raised to his level because it was hoped that a solution would be worked out 
at lower levels�”79 The president understood that organizational processes were 
necessary to achieve reversion and were functioning as intended� The negotiators 
elevated some issues to him, even if they did not require his action� It appears, 
however, that they did not raise the question of the Senkaku Islands until near 
the end of the negotiations�
Status of the Senkakus: Decision Deferred
As part of the Okinawa reversion negotiations, the United States and Japan 
needed to determine which territories were included in the reversion, and their 
sovereignty� The State Department already had wrestled with questions about the 
Senkakus’ sovereignty before the November 1969 Nixon-Satō communiqué and 
so may have been predisposed to handle it without seeking a presidential-level 
decision, but instead in a manner consistent with precedent and conforming with 
the negotiating instructions�
Initial questions about the Senkakus’ sovereignty came not from Japan but 
from U�S� oil companies seeking to explore surrounding waters� The prospect of 
oil reserves near the islands appears to have provided the first prompt to the U�S� 
State Department to consider its position on the islands’ sovereignty� In May 1969, 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) 
reported that oil and gas could be found under the seabed near the Senkakus, 
and in fact the area “might contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs 
in the world”—which attracted the attention of the international oil industry�80
Within a month of the ECAFE report, a U�S� oil company, Gulf Pittsburgh, 
asked the State Department about maritime boundary lines near the Senkakus 
to determine which country—perhaps even the United States—could grant 
permission to survey the adjacent seabed� Robert W� Barnett, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, replied that “international 
law is murky�” He then described the dilemma facing the United States� “Settle-
ment of the Ryukyu-Taiwan boundary question would require that the U�S� act 
for Japan in negotiations with the Republic of China, since the U�S� administers 
the Ryukyus but recognizes that residual sovereignty rests with Japan�” Further-
more, “the U�S� is reluctant to get involved on this matter at this time with return 
of the Ryukyus under active discussion with the Japanese�” The lines of sovereign 
authority were just as murky as international law, and U�S� officials were not will-
ing to upset reversion negotiations, which were still at an early stage, to assist 
Gulf Pittsburgh�81
Beyond the Senkakus, broader U�S� policy toward competing maritime claims 
across East Asian sought to reduce the risk of conflict and maintain positive U�S� 
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relations with all claimants� Specifically, a January 1971 memorandum within the 
State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs outlined policy goals 
in this and other regional territorial disputes� These goals included avoiding U�S�-
PRC conflict and avoiding “exacerbation of U�S�-PRC and U�S�–[government of 
the Republic of China] relations in general over this matter,” which might mean 
“avoiding taking a position either way�” It further advocated avoiding damage to 
U�S� relations with other countries in East Asia, peacefully resolving the conflict-
ing claims, and avoiding fostering “permanent animosities that would preclude 
a peaceful general settlement of existing differences in the East Asia area�” The 
memo’s author lamented that these goals “seem mutually exclusive, but this 
merely reflects the complexity of the situation�”82 In support of this policy of not 
taking a position, the U�S� government asked U�S� oil companies “to stay out of 
disputed areas until claims are settled” and warned companies “operating Ameri-
can vessels anywhere in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea and the Taiwan Strait 
that [the United States] will not provide military protection in the event their 
operations are challenged�”83
During reversion negotiations, U�S� officials believed that the territorial de-
scriptions in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement should be consistent with the 
ambiguous phrasing used in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty� Their Japanese 
counterparts, however, argued that the agreement should state explicitly the 
boundaries of the territories transferred to Japan, and that those boundaries 
should encompass the Senkakus� On October 8, 1970, Japanese negotiators sub-
mitted a proposed draft agreement that included the coordinates USCAR had 
used to define its boundaries in 1953, to “add precision” but also to address the 
“Senkakus issue�” Officials from the U�S� embassy countered this proposal, telling 
their Japanese counterparts that “(1) the [U�S� government] prefers to stay out 
of the middle of the Senkakus issue, [and] (2) that [the] reversion agreement is 
probably not [the] proper place to refer even indirectly to [the] Senkakus dis-
pute�” U�S� officials further emphasized that the reversion agreement’s description 
of the boundaries should match the San Francisco treaty’s wording�84
The State Department’s strong organizational preference not to intervene in 
territorial disputes may have influenced its position on the Senkakus’ status� 
Furthermore, decision makers within the State Department may have considered 
their stance on the Senkakus to be consistent with specific precedent regarding 
the Ryukyus, such as Secretary of State Dulles’s “residual sovereignty” interpre-
tation of the 1951 San Francisco treaty and existing policy toward territorial 
disputes more generally� It therefore would be unsurprising that, unlike other 
issues such as civil aviation and the VOA, the State Department did not bring this 
issue to President Nixon’s attention during the negotiations� Instead, negotiators 
in Tokyo and State Department officials in Washington appear to have believed 
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that their solution to this issue was within their instructions and consistent with 
U�S� policy�
How to address the Senkaku Islands in the reversion agreement remained 
unresolved through at least the final months of U�S�-Japanese negotiations� A 
cable that the U�S� embassy in Tokyo sent in March 1971, three months before the 
treaty was signed, identified the status of the Senkakus as one of nearly twenty 
“outstanding problems which must be resolved before final arrangements can be 
worked out for signing reversion agreement�” The cable indicates that negotiators 
still were “awaiting Washington guidance for appropriate method of referring to 
Senkakus�”85 It is unclear from whom in Washington the negotiators were await-
ing a response, but there is no indication the issue was raised outside State De-
partment headquarters� President Nixon and Kissinger both later said that they 
were not aware of this issue until April 1971, when Taiwan’s ambassador brought 
it up with them�86 By that point, however, U�S� and Japanese negotiators already 
had agreed on how to handle these islands�
Ultimately, by May 1971, U�S� and Japanese negotiators referenced the broad 
language of the 1951 peace treaty in the draft reversion agreement, and added 
an “agreed minute” that explicitly delineated the boundaries of the administered 
area� Providing instructions to U�S� negotiators in May 1971, Under Secretary of 
State John N� Irwin II wrote that it was “essential to limit metes and bounds to 
context of area U�S� now administering�” Anything more expansive could result in 
the U�S� government’s “involvement in sovereignty issue,” which the United States 
was trying to avoid�87 As a result, the treaty defined “the Ryukyu Islands and the 
Daito Islands” as “all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to 
which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and 
jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article III of 
the Treaty of Peace with Japan�” The agreed minute provided points of latitude 
and longitude that matched those used in USCAR’s Proclamation 27 of 1953 (see 
map) to describe “the territories under the administration of the United States 
of America�”88 Thus did U�S� negotiators dodge a definitive decision on the status 
of the Senkakus�
The U�S� position of not recognizing any claims to the Senkakus was unsat-
isfying to some in Japan, but did not halt reversion� During the negotiations, 
Japan’s foreign minister expressed his unhappiness with the “uncertain attitude” 
of the United States toward the Senkakus and the Japanese ambassador to Wash-
ington similarly criticized the U�S� “public position of neutrality�”89 Days before 
the Okinawa Reversion Agreement was signed, two members of Prime Minister 
Satō’s cabinet—the director of Japan’s Defense Agency and the minister for ad-
ministrative affairs—informed Satō that they did not concur with the agreement, 
because the United States would not address the Senkakus’ sovereignty� Their 
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nonconcurrence could have blocked Japan’s execution of the agreement� Re-
sponding to Minister for Administrative Affairs Sadanori Yamanaka’s objection, 
Satō said, “[Yamanaka] is passionate about Okinawa, and I see that he cannot be 
budged from his position� However, if this is the case, there is no telling when 
Okinawa will get returned�”90 Although the U�S� position may not have been ideal 
for Japan, Prime Minister Satō placed such a high priority on recovering Okinawa 
that he accepted the ambiguous U�S� Senkaku position so as to complete the Oki-
nawa Reversion Agreement�
U�S� negotiators received clear objectives and constraints, then operated 
within them to execute the policy of reverting Okinawa, and ultimately felt that 
they had performed successfully� In a cable sent several weeks before the agree-
ment was signed, the U�S� embassy in Tokyo summarized the negotiations and 
highlighted officials’ belief that “we have substantially carried out negotiating 
instructions with changes made only with Washington concurrence to accom-
modate firm GOJ [government of Japan] positions�” The embassy listed over a 
dozen approved deviations from their instructions, including the status of the 
Senkaku Islands� The cable indicated that the agreement avoids “making specific 
reference to [the] disputed Senkaku Islands (although covered in agreed minute) 
and clearly relates territories to be relinquished to those now administered by 
USG [U�S� government]�” The negotiators did not consider this to be a controver-
sial outcome� They concluded this summary of their work on the reversion agree-
ment with the perhaps self-serving commentary that “while there has been a hard 
and protracted negotiation with give and take from both sides, the fundamental 
objective of preserving an effective military base structure in Okinawa has been 
achieved�”91 In other words, mission accomplished�
BARGAINING GAMES AND COMPETING CLAIMS
This article next evaluates whether and how the interests of other domestic enti-
ties, foreign countries, and Nixon’s own policy initiatives may have affected U�S� 
policy toward the Senkakus during the Okinawa reversion negotiations� Relevant 
actors included governments of the other claimants (Taiwan and China); U�S� 
textile manufacturers; and Nixon, with regard to his own secret effort to improve 
relations with Beijing� This section will describe how these external factors in-
teracted with the reversion negotiations and affected U�S� decisions on the Sen-
kakus� In each case, Nixon decided to favor returning control over the Senkakus 
to Japan, rather than accommodating other claimants or interests�
As rival claimants for the Senkakus emerged in late 1970 and early 1971, 
these competing interests complicated U�S� efforts to avoid making a decision 
on the Senkakus’ sovereignty� Taiwan and China did not challenge Japan’s claim 
and assert their own until Okinawa reversion negotiations were well under way� 
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Japanese and Taiwan diplomats discussed the sovereign status of the Senkakus in 
the summer of 1970, and by September the Japanese formally asserted that the 
Senkakus belonged to their country�92 Taipei quickly contested this claim, and 
later announced its own on February 23, 1971�93 China staked its claim in a De-
cember 4, 1970, radio broadcast, and reiterated it over a year later in a December 
30, 1971, statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs�94
Different actors within the U�S� government also had a range of interests re-
lated to these competing territorial claims� Trade negotiators saw the Senkakus 
as a carrot to spur Taiwan’s cooperation in textile trade negotiations� Nixon in-
tervened, however, to affirm the U�S� position on the Senkakus and preserve the 
Okinawa Reversion Agreement� Ongoing but secretive efforts to open relations 
with China could have influenced policy toward the Senkaku Islands if more 
participants had been aware of Nixon’s overtures to Beijing� This secrecy likely 
inhibited some of the normal bureaucratic conflict and compromise across the 
U�S� government that might have brought more scrutiny to U�S� policy toward the 
Senkakus and how it would affect future relations with China� Under the pressure 
of the deadline for signing the reversion agreement, U�S� policy makers, including 
President Nixon, weighed these issues against the goal of reverting Okinawa� In 
both cases, U�S� leaders concluded that this territorial dispute should not obstruct 
reverting Okinawa�
Taiwan and Textiles: “High Politics at Home and Abroad”
Taiwan sought U�S� support for its claim on the Senkakus and linked this issue 
with a textiles trade dispute, forcing President Nixon to decide whether the Unit-
ed States should weigh in on the Senkakus’ sovereignty question more explicitly� 
Following its February 1971 claim, Taipei elicited U�S� support, both by detailing 
its sovereignty claim in a diplomatic note verbale and by dispatching its ambas-
sador to lobby the White House� The March 15, 1971, diplomatic note provided 
historical, geological, and economic justifications for Taiwan’s claim, but also 
explained why Taipei had not asserted its sovereignty any earlier� “For regional 
security considerations the government of the ROC has hitherto not challenged 
the U�S� military occupation of the Senkakus under Article 3 of the San Francisco 
Treaty�” Taiwan essentially argued that it had not voiced its claim previously to 
avoid antagonizing the United States, the guarantor of its security� The note went 
on to ask Washington to restore Taipei’s sovereignty over the Senkakus rather 
than revert the islands to Tokyo along with Okinawa�95
Taiwan’s ambassador, Chow Shu-kai, raised the question of the Senkakus’ 
sovereignty with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger on April 12, 1971� He 
emphasized the political importance of these islands to Taiwan, stating that “the 
issue of nationalism was deeply involved�” Henry Kissinger was not familiar 
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with the issue and told the ambassador that he was “looking into the Senkakus 
matter�”96 The next day, an NSC staffer sent a memo to Kissinger that detailed 
Taiwan’s claim, noted that Japan “has a comparable list of apparently offsetting 
arguments,” and explained that “State’s position is that in occupying the Ryukyus 
and the Senkakus in 1945, and in proposing to return them to Japan in 1972, the 
U�S� passes no judgement as to conflicting claims over any portion of them, which 
should be settled directly by the parties concerned�” In a handwritten marginal 
note, Kissinger remarked, “But that is nonsense since it gives islands to Japan� 
How can we get a more neutral position?”97 Despite Kissinger’s frustration with 
this apparent contradiction, U�S� policy did not change�
Taiwan’s claim and U�S� policy dramatically came to a head in June 1971, only 
weeks before the United States and Japan planned to sign the Okinawa Rever-
sion Agreement� In parallel with the Okinawa negotiations, President Nixon also 
discussed textile trade issues with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea� Responding 
to political pressure from southern states affected by competition with Asian 
textile manufacturers, Nixon sought voluntary export restrictions from those 
countries�98 He designated former Treasury Secretary David M� Kennedy to lead 
these negotiations�
Kennedy reported from Taipei that the Taiwan government proposed linking 
the Senkakus’ sovereignty with textile trade concessions� Nixon’s international 
economic adviser, Peter G� Peterson, informed the president on June 7 that “Am-
bassador Kennedy is convinced that the ‘only’ way to resolve the [textile] issue is 
to withhold turning the Senkaku Islands over to Japanese control�”99 That same 
day, Henry Kissinger and Peterson urgently requested to meet with Nixon about 
“the issue of the Senkaku Islands,” which Kissinger described as “a delicate issue 
of the greatest importance to the Republic of China�”100 The meeting was sched-
uled for the same afternoon�
Hours before the meeting, Kissinger spoke with Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs U� Alexis Johnson in two telephone calls to understand how 
changing the status of the Senkakus in response to Taipei’s demands could affect 
the Okinawa negotiation� Johnson had unique experience on this issue because 
he had served as U�S� ambassador to Tokyo from 1966 to 1969 and had been 
involved with the Okinawa reversion negotiations from the beginning�101 In the 
first call, Kissinger started in by asking, “About those God damn islands, where 
do we stand?” Johnson explained that “[i]t’s frozen in the text of the agreement 
with Japan” and had been since before Taiwan’s ambassador Chow first brought 
up the issue at the White House that April�102 In the second call, Johnson ex-
plained that if the United States changed its position on the Senkakus to favor 
Taiwan, “there is not the slightest question about this blowing up the Okinawa 
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negotiations with the Japanese�” He also explained that “it [the Senkakus] is not 
our territory� We have no sovereignty� It is a territorial dispute under our pres-
ent administration of Okinawa� We just administer it—it is a Japanese-Chinese 
[meaning Japanese-ROC] question�”103 Johnson did not elaborate on why he felt 
the deal would collapse if the United States reneged on the existing draft agree-
ment about the islands� Perhaps his extensive professional experience in Japan 
and personal involvement with the Okinawa negotiations caused him to present a 
worst-case assessment of Japan’s reaction� Alternatively, he was acutely aware that 
the Senate needed time to review and ratify the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, 
so he also may have been wary of reopening the negotiations because doing so 
might weaken support on Capitol Hill and delay or derail ratification�104
A short time before meeting with Kissinger and Peterson, Nixon called Kis-
singer to prepare for the discussion ahead� According to the transcript of that 
brief conversation, Kissinger, echoing Johnson, said that changing the U�S� posi-
tion on the Senkakus would “blow up negotiations with Japan�” Nixon reiterated 
the importance of reaching a deal on textiles, to which Kissinger countered, “This 
would be a hell of a price to pay with the Japanese� The treaty is to be signed 
in about a week�” Appearing to agree with his national security advisor, Nixon 
wrapped up the call by asking whether Kissinger had “gotten him [Peterson] 
around” to agreeing with his view, to which Kissinger replied, “He’s all right�”105 
The president seemed to have made up his mind about the Senkakus prior to 
meeting with his two senior national security and economic advisers�
Kissinger and Peterson met with the president on the afternoon of June 7, 
1971; Nixon’s taping system recorded their conversation�106 Nixon began by 
indicating the importance of the decision before him, remarking that “what’s 
involved here is some high politics at home and abroad�” He told them both 
that “a lot of the things here have to be done in the context of our relations with 
Japan� � � � You understand that?” Kissinger then described his understanding of 
the history behind the decision: “In 1951 when the peace treaty was signed the 
Senkaku Islands were made part of the Okinawa administrative arrangement in 
which we handled the administration and the Japanese received sovereignty� � � � 
As a result of that we treated the islands as part of the Okinawa complex, since we 
had already granted the Japanese residual sovereignty in ’51 and it’s never been 
really disputed during the negotiations�” He concluded that “if we now suddenly, 
in the last week of the negotiations, surface this � � � it would blow up the Okinawa 
negotiations�” Kissinger later added, “[M]y major concern is that this would be 
seen in Japan now as deliberate sabotage of the treaty and would profoundly 
jeopardize our relations there�”
Nixon abruptly shifted the conversation to Taiwan, but rather than discussing 
Taipei’s arguments in detail he instead asked, “Is there something else we can do 
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with Taiwan?” In other words, what could we offer Taiwan other than changing 
our position on the Senkakus? Options included selling weapons to Taiwan or 
sending the Secretary of Defense to visit Taipei� Nixon, frustrated with the poor 
choices in front of him, then acknowledged, “I don’t think we can go back on 
Okinawa, I think our long range relationship is symbolic�” He wanted to find an-
other opportunity to “screw them [Japan] on trade,” but it was not worth risking 
Okinawa reversion to trade the Senkaku Islands for a textiles deal with Taiwan� 
He added, “I hope to God that we can think of some other things where we can 
stand up and kick the Japanese in the butt,” but he was unwilling to sacrifice Oki-
nawa reversion to that end�
Following Nixon’s decision, Kissinger criticized how the Okinawa reversion 
negotiators appeared to have put Nixon in a bind, and analyzed the impact of 
the U�S� position on the Senkakus� He asserted that “this is one of those examples 
where the bureaucracy, ’til they got into trouble, no one even told us there was 
an issue, and I frankly had never even heard of these islands until—” Nixon 
interrupted, “I never heard of ’em�” Kissinger resumed by saying, “[U]ntil Chow 
[Taiwan’s ambassador] came in here to see you [in April]�” To which Nixon 
added, “[O]h yeah, he hit those items�” After recounting the post–World War II 
history of the Senkakus, Kissinger lamented that by the time he first learned of 
the islands “they had already been given away because they had automatically 
been included by the Japanese in the reversion of Okinawa�” Peterson then asked, 
“[H]ow crucial are these islands to the Japanese?” and “[A]re you sure they are 
urgently important?” Kissinger responded, “I think it’s the sort of issue which, if 
it had been raised six months ago, we could have found, could have found out, 
but I suspect if it’s done now, it will look like a deliberate attempt to sabotage the 
treaty�” Kissinger then noted—perhaps presciently—that the U�S� position “in 
fact means they [the Senkakus] are going to Japan because nothing short of war 
is ever going to get them off these islands�”
Afterward Peterson relayed the outcome to Kennedy in Taipei� “After lengthy 
discussion, the President’s decision on the islands is that the [Okinawa rever-
sion] deal has gone too far and too many commitments made to back off now� � � � 
The President was deeply regretful that he could not help on this, but he felt that 
the decision was simply not possible�”107 With so little time remaining before 
signing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, Nixon was unwilling to withhold 
the Senkakus from Japan and upend the progress made over many years toward 
returning Okinawa�
Several days later, Robert I� Starr, the legal adviser to the State Department’s 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, assessed the legal aspects of Taiwan’s 
claim and concluded that the government of Taiwan “is not without legal argu-
ment under its 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan � � � to call upon the [government 
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of Japan] to settle the Senkakus dispute by negotiation or by other pacific means 
including third party adjudication�” He went on, however, to outline legal and 
political obstacles to U�S� involvement� “It is open to serious doubt whether � � � 
the [U�S� government] may properly raise the Senkakus issue with Japan” through 
mechanisms provided by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, because Taiwan was 
not a signatory to that treaty� Furthermore, “it is the firm policy of the [U�S� 
government] to take no position on the merits of the dispute�” He added that 
“there are other considerations which may also bear upon the question of the ap-
propriate [U�S� government] posture on this matter,” specifically the importance 
of U�S�-Japan relations and that “Japan obviously attaches great significance to 
the impending return of Okinawa, including the Senkakus�” His memo records 
that in response to pressure from Taiwan, the United States had only “asked the 
[government of Japan] to agree to discuss the matter with the [government of 
Taiwan]�”108 Thus, legal considerations apparently were not compelling enough 
to outweigh the political impetus to revert Okinawa�
United States–China Rapprochement: Incalculable Consequences
The U�S� response to China’s claim on the Senkakus is more difficult to assess, 
largely because the United States neither recognized the PRC nor had normal 
diplomatic relations with it but secretly sought rapprochement with the regime� 
This goal in effect was hidden from the normal back-and-forth of the policy pro-
cess� If participants across the government had been aware of President Nixon’s 
intent to open relations with China, then perhaps Senkakus policy could have 
been developed with that in mind� Instead, U�S� policy makers were cognizant 
of Beijing’s claim but were unsure about how to treat it, particularly since some 
perceived it as intertwined with Taipei’s claim�
China announced its claim on the Senkakus in December 1970, only six 
months before the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement� Yet even within 
this short period, U�S� policy makers considered the implications of China’s claim� 
The previously mentioned June 1971 memo by State Department legal adviser 
Starr not only assessed the legality of Taiwan’s claim but pointed out that China 
had a stake in the outcome as well� “Then too, there is the position of [China] to 
consider� � � � If we press the [government of Japan] to negotiate with the [govern-
ment of Taiwan], we run the risk of aggravating unnecessarily the state of both 
the [U�S� government’s] and [the government of Japan’s] relations with Peking� It 
is difficult to imagine any conceivable benefit in terms of our relations with the 
[government of Taiwan] that would justify such a risk, the full consequences of 
which may not even be calculable at this time�”109
This memo was written a month before Kissinger’s secret July 1971 visit to 
China, so it was understandably difficult for State Department officials to better 
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envision the impact of a less ambiguous policy on the Senkakus� Nevertheless, 
the risks of antagonizing China further did not seem to outweigh the possible 
benefits of encouraging Tokyo and Taipei to negotiate about the Senkakus�
The uncertain future of Japan’s relations with China may have similarly influ-
enced how Tokyo dealt with Beijing and Taipei on the Senkakus in this period� In 
a December 1970 cable, a U�S� diplomat in Taiwan described this interaction with 
a Japanese counterpart� “Japan would never, [the Japanese diplomat] repeated, 
never negotiate [the sovereignty of the Senkakus] seriously with [the govern-
ment of Taiwan], because of the PRC�” According to the Japanese diplomat’s 
perspective, negotiations with Taiwan “would involve and thereby commit the 
[government of Japan] to and with the [government of Taiwan] in this area, and 
preclude involvement and commitment to the PRC in this area�”110 Similarly, the 
Central Intelligence Agency assessed in 1971 that “Japan finds itself caught in a 
painful dilemma” regarding whether and how to deal with Taipei and Beijing on 
the Senkakus� “To the extent that Tokyo solves its problems with Taipei, it dam-
ages its long-range hopes of improving relations with Peking�”111
The United States appears to have been trapped in a similar dilemma between 
the two Chinese capitals, and arrived at a compromise solution that would have 
the least impact on both, while still completing the Okinawa Reversion Agree-
ment with Japan� During Nixon’s June 7, 1971, meeting with Kissinger and Peter-
son, Kissinger briefly described how he thought China would react if the United 
States sided with Taiwan on the Senkakus� “The Senkaku Islands, strangely 
enough, as far as our relations with Communist China are concerned, wouldn’t 
bother them because they’d prefer them part of Taiwan because they could then 
grab them [the Senkakus] if they think they can grab Taiwan�”112 There was no 
discussion, however, about how China might respond if the United States main-
tained its ostensibly hands-off approach� President Nixon was aware that the 
outcome of the Senkakus negotiations with Tokyo could have some bearing on 
the secret discussions with Beijing, but he did not direct any changes to the policy 
of noninvolvement in Senkakus sovereignty claims�113
If the United States in fact was trying to curry favor with China, a more con-
certed effort might have been made to withhold the Senkakus from Japan to 
benefit this budding, but closely held, relationship� No evidence suggests that U�S� 
leaders were any more interested in acceding to Beijing’s claim than they were 
to Taipei’s� In fact—likely because of the secrecy surrounding the pending rap-
prochement—most U�S� policy makers negotiating the return of Okinawa could 
only speculate about the impact of their Senkakus position on China� The clan-
destine nature of the effort to improve relations with China may have removed it 
from the normal policy process and simultaneously prevented U�S� policy makers 
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from analyzing more thoroughly the expected impact of U�S� decisions regarding 
the Senkakus�
OUTCOME: OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT AND  
THE SENKAKUS
On June 18, 1971, the U�S� Secretary of State in Washington and the Japanese 
foreign minister in Tokyo signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in simul-
taneous ceremonies coordinated by a satellite television connection�114 Over the 
objections of both Chinas, the United States returned administrative control 
over the Senkakus to Japan and took no position on the competing sovereignty 
claims� U�S� Secretary of State William P� Rogers defended the policy in testimony 
to the U�S� Senate ahead of the treaty’s ratification� “We have made it clear that 
this treaty does not affect the legal status of [the Senkaku Islands] at all� Whatever 
the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after 
the treaty comes into effect�”115 Robert Starr, the State Department legal adviser, 
submitted to the Senate a letter more formally describing the U�S� government’s 
position on the Senkakus�
The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands 
to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underly-
ing claims� The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it 
transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving 
back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants� The United States has 
made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to 
the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned�116
On May 15, 1972, Japan resumed its sovereignty over Okinawa and the 
Ryukyu Islands and received administrative control over the Senkakus� To this 
day, U�S� policy regarding the Senkakus’ sovereign status remains consistent with 
Starr’s letter�
The U�S� policy of noninvolvement was an imperfect compromise among 
conflicting interests, including Okinawa reversion, textile negotiations, and the 
secret rapprochement between the United States and China� Among these objec-
tives, returning Okinawa to Japan and reinforcing the U�S�-Japan alliance appear 
to have been very consequential in the decisions about the status of the Senkaku 
Islands� Textile negotiations with Taipei and future U�S� relations with Beijing—
the other claimants for attention—weighed on policy makers to some degree, 
but did not scuttle the first priority of reverting Okinawa and all other islands 
under U�S� administrative control to Japan� In the end, the U�S� policy was accept-
able to the Japanese while providing enough ambiguity to avoid roiling relations 
with Taiwan and China� In retrospect, Charles Schmitz described how he and 
other U�S� negotiators working on the Okinawa Reversion Agreement “felt stuck 
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and vulnerable to attack from all sides�” He believed that the U�S� position was a 
“middle road” that “neatly extracted us from the middle of a Japanese-Chinese 
set-to” while still successfully reverting Okinawa to Japan�117
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY POLICY:  
REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICT
Why should we understand how the United States arrived at its Senkaku Islands 
policy over four decades ago? Why should we plumb the complexities of govern-
ment behavior regarding these uninhabited islands? First, doing so demonstrates 
how existing explanations are incomplete� Second, doing so provides needed his-
torical context for a particularly thorny contemporary policy issue in which the 
United States is more closely involved than many appreciate� Lastly, this historical 
background provides a foundation on which to build a better-informed strategy 
toward the Senkaku Islands and maintain peace and stability in East Asia�
First, several theories seek to explain why the United States chose an ostensibly 
neutral position on the Senkakus that was, according to Kissinger at the time, 
“nonsense since it gives [the] islands to Japan�”118 Some analysts and the govern-
ment of China divine that Cold War power politics drove this decision� Kissinger 
believed that bureaucrats in the State Department forced a fait accompli on Presi-
dent Nixon� Both of these theories are incomplete and too narrow, because they 
do not consider the evidence that points to a more complex explanation within 
the broader context of returning Okinawa to Japan�
In many respects, realpolitik considerations drove U�S� decision-making, but 
American strategy centered on whether to retain Okinawa for its bases or revert 
it to Japan to improve relations� The question of the Senkaku Islands was only one 
among many challenging incidental issues negotiated prior to reversion� Deci-
sions regarding the Senkakus appear to have been made while holding the goal 
of reverting Okinawa foremost in mind� U�S� negotiators crafted a policy that was 
within the bounds of their negotiating instructions, was consistent with existing 
policy, and achieved the goal of reverting Okinawa while retaining flexible basing 
rights� This policy output was subject to the normal policy processes within the 
U�S� government and among other claimants� Particularly in the example of the 
potential textiles deal with Taiwan, proponents of this policy squared off against 
advocates of other approaches and forced a presidential decision� Conversely, 
there was perhaps a missed opportunity for healthy intragovernmental bargain-
ing regarding China’s claim on the Senkakus because many U�S� policy makers 
were in the dark about Nixon’s intentions toward Beijing�
Second, history is an ever-present factor in international affairs, but it is par-
ticularly relevant in East Asia, and especially with regard to the numerous mari-
time disputes along the region’s periphery� The legacy of Japanese aggression in 
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the early twentieth century, for instance, still colors Tokyo’s relations with other 
capitals in East Asia�119 President Xi Jinping of China has wielded history in his 
relations with President Donald J� Trump, first lecturing him during a 2017 sum-
mit in Florida about China’s historical role on the Korean Peninsula and then 
impressing him with China’s long history during a state visit to Beijing later that 
year; both efforts may have been intended to shape Trump’s perception of China 
and its role in Asia�120 History’s influence does not end at the water’s edge� In 
the South China Sea, China claims “historical rights” to numerous islands and 
islets�121 Other Southeast Asian states dispute these claims and lodge their own 
historically informed counterclaims� In the East China Sea, China might not limit 
its claims to just the Senkaku Islands; some Chinese academics cite Okinawa’s 
historical relationship with China to argue that Beijing could claim Okinawa and 
others among the Ryukyu Islands as well�122
It is essential that contemporary U�S� policy makers understand and appreciate 
the U�S� role in the dispute over the Senkaku Islands� Unlike the case with any 
other modern East Asian territorial dispute, the United States not only once con-
trolled these disputed islands; it also made decisions that perpetuated the dispute 
and—by pledging to include the islands in treaty obligations to Japan—arguably 
compounded it� Because of this intimate and unique historical relationship be-
tween the United States and the Senkakus, Washington should bear more of the 
burden for either encouraging the claimants to settle the dispute or ensuring that 
this political conflict does not lead to a war�
Furthermore, any of the three claimants to the Senkakus could misrepresent 
the historical record and the U�S� position on the Senkakus’ sovereignty to advo-
cate its position or debase a competing claim� China does just that, for example, 
in arguing that the United States arbitrarily expanded its definition of the Ryukyu 
Islands with the 1953 USCAR Proclamation 27� The historical record, as shown 
on the map, confirms that the United States considered the Senkaku Islands to 
fall under its administration of the Ryukyus after Japan’s surrender in 1945� Each 
time the United States redefined its conception of the Ryukyu Islands, it included 
the Senkakus�
Third, the U�S� policy of not recognizing any of the claims to the Senkakus may 
have helped achieve U�S� foreign policy goals in East Asia in the 1970s, but U�S� 
ambiguity left an unresolved territorial dispute among China, Taiwan, and Japan� 
This territorial dispute—particularly between Japan and an increasingly asser-
tive China—risks becoming a flash point of war� It seems increasingly likely that 
Kissinger was right when he told Nixon in 1971 that “nothing short of war is ever 
going to get [Japan] off these islands�”123 How should the United States—as an ally 
of Japan and the country that ceded administrative control to it—minimize the 
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risk of such a war? How can the United States mitigate the strategic risk caused 
by a decision deferred almost five decades ago?
Past and present experience with other disputed islands on China’s maritime 
flanks offers valuable guideposts� Analyzing the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea, Ely Ratner, an NSC official under President Barack H� Obama, writes 
that “U�S� policymakers should recognize that China’s behavior in the [South 
China] sea is based on its perception of how the United States will respond� The 
lack of U�S� resistance has led Beijing to conclude that the United States will not 
compromise its relationship with China over the South China Sea�”124 The United 
States should not let China draw a similar conclusion about the Senkaku Islands�
To paraphrase Schelling, the Senkakus could become a modern “ragged edge,” 
about which U�S� intentions risk being ambiguous� Although the United States 
publicly asserts that the Senkaku Islands fall within the U�S� treaty commitment 
to defend Japan, Washington’s ambiguity on their sovereignty could undermine, 
in the perceptions of all three claimants, the credibility of Washington’s com-
mitment� Domestically, it also may be difficult to convince the U�S� public that 
the uninhabited and distant Senkaku Islands are worth fighting for, which could 
weaken further foreign perceptions of U�S� credibility�
To reduce these risks, the Trump administration should heed Schelling’s ob-
servation that “ritual and diplomacy can enhance or erode” U�S� security commit-
ments�125 Senior U�S� leaders, including the president, should continue to assert 
publicly and privately to all claimants that, while the United States is agnostic 
on Senkaku sovereignty questions, Japan administratively controls the Senkakus 
and, because of treaty obligations, the United States will defend the islands� Yet, 
while necessary, “ritual and diplomacy” alone may be insufficient� U�S� strategy 
should include continued and comprehensive bilateral (U�S�-Japan) military 
cooperation, multilateral (U�S�-Japan-China-Taiwan) diplomatic efforts, and per-
haps a fundamental reevaluation of the U�S� political stance toward the Senkakus�
Militarily, visible but quietly executed demonstrations of the U�S� intention 
and capability to defend Japan’s administrative control of the Senkakus should 
continue� Able to project power in the region and operate with Japanese forces, 
the U�S� military plays a vital role in demonstrating U�S� commitment� B-52 
bombers challenged China’s East China Sea ADIZ within days of its announce-
ment in November 2013�126 More recently, in March and August 2017, B-1B 
bombers have participated in bilateral exercises with Japan Air Self-Defense 
Force F-15 fighters near the Senkaku Islands “to demonstrate the solidarity 
and resolve we share with our allies to preserve peace and security in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific�”127 The U�S� Navy routinely operates at sea in the western Pacific 
and conducts exercises with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force�128 The U�S� 
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Marine Corps and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force since 2006 have held annual 
exercises that have evolved from demonstrating humanitarian relief operations 
to practicing “recapturing invaded islands�”129 These military operations and 
exercises should continue, both for the political signal they send and to improve 
U�S�-Japanese interoperability�
The United States also should support Tokyo’s ongoing efforts to strengthen 
Japan’s capability to defend the numerous isolated islands in its remote “south-
western region,” which includes the Senkakus�130 This approach could include 
encouraging Japan to invest in weapon systems and training that would enable it 
better to conduct routine operations around the distant Senkakus in peacetime, 
and in wartime to project defensive military power or to sustain its defenses un-
til U�S� forces could intervene�131 This equipment could include high-endurance 
coast guard cutters, long-range fighter aircraft, maritime-patrol aircraft, subma-
rines, aviation-capable ships, and upgrades to existing systems� Some changes, for 
example, could help Japan use its force more efficiently� Japan’s defense minister 
explained in January 2018 that the planned acquisition of two land-based Aegis 
Ashore ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems could free up Japan’s BMD-
capable destroyers for use in the southwest rather than being tethered to BMD 
operating areas closer to Japan’s home islands� Japan has considered other force-
structure changes that the United States should endorse, such as modifying its 
two largest helicopter carriers to operate the Joint Strike Fighter and purchasing 
standoff air-to-surface missiles that could be used to fend off amphibious as-
saults�132 Particularly if an evaluation of Japan’s strategy for defending against 
an increasingly capable Chinese threat informs weapons-procurement and 
-modernization decisions, these steps could improve Japan’s ability to deter con-
flict over the Senkakus and to operate effectively alongside the United States�133
Diplomatically, the United States should encourage communication and co-
operation among all three claimants to the Senkakus� Optimistically, President 
Trump could emulate U� S� Grant’s efforts during his 1879 visit to East Asia and 
encourage all claimants to meet and resolve their differences� However, the posi-
tions of the claimants may be too entrenched� Japan is unlikely to leave the islands 
voluntarily and neither China nor Taiwan appears ready to bargain away what 
Beijing calls “an inherent territory of China�” Furthermore, Beijing or Taipei or 
both may not view Washington as an honest broker� More practically, the United 
States should help the claimants maintain a stable political equilibrium regard-
ing the Senkakus, which could include advocating bilateral discussions between 
Japan and China about managing the Chinese fishing fleets operating near the 
Senkakus or establishing communications protocols for Chinese and Japanese 
naval and coast guard vessels to use while operating near the islands�134
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The United States may find, however, that treaty commitments, military pos-
turing, and diplomatic entreaties cannot curb China’s assertiveness toward the 
Senkakus� While Chinese fishing and other maritime activity near the Senkaku 
Islands generally has been nonconfrontational in recent years, the January 2018 
patrol near the Senkakus by a Chinese warship and submarine and the February 
2018 incursion by three Chinese patrol ships into Japan’s claimed territorial wa-
ters indicate that China easily could resume a more forceful approach�135
If China increases political, military, and economic pressure on the Senkaku 
Islands, the United States should consider dropping the fig leaf of not taking a po-
sition on their sovereignty� Although the approach is politically convenient and 
consistent with U�S� policy for other maritime sovereignty disputes in East Asia, 
it may frustrate efforts to deter China and to assure Japan credibly of U�S� com-
mitment�136 At the very least, letting China know that this option is “on the table” 
may demonstrate to Beijing that destabilizing actions could elicit significant 
political responses short of war� It could be argued that taking a position on the 
Senkakus’ sovereignty might expose the United States to demands that it weigh in 
on other territorial disputes, particularly others involving Japan, such as Dokdo/
Takeshima with South Korea and the Southern Kurils / Northern Territories with 
Russia� The Senkakus case is unique, however, because it involves the only dis-
puted territory that the United States administered previously� Overwrought fear 
of setting a precedent should not preclude the United States from finally making 
a decision it deferred nearly fifty years ago�
U�S� decisions in returning the administration of the Senkaku Islands to Japan 
likely were not motivated by a desire to use the Senkakus to shape the western 
Pacific security environment, whether by driving a wedge between Japan and 
China or favoring one claimant over the other� Neither was it the result of a 
bureaucracy run amok� Instead, evidence suggests that it may have been an out-
come of U�S� government decision-making that was oriented toward the goal of 
returning Okinawa to Japan and strengthening the U�S�-Japan alliance� Nearly a 
half century later, these uninhabited islands remain a challenge for U�S� political 
leaders, who should reaffirm and strengthen expectations of U�S� intentions to 
deter challenges by Beijing and reassure Tokyo� These steps also may spur U�S� 
domestic interest and better inform the public about U�S� security obligations 
in Asia� Effective “ritual and diplomacy,” complemented by a more robust U�S�-
Japan military posture and a political willingness to wrestle with a long-deferred 
decision, could make the Senkakus less of a “ragged edge” for the United States in 
Asia and increase the likelihood of continued calm in the East China Sea�
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